A Shenanigan in IPR Denials by Brimley, Jordan
BYU Law Review 
Volume 2019 Issue 3 Article 7 
Spring 5-27-2020 
A Shenanigan in IPR Denials 
Jordan Brimley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan Brimley, A Shenanigan in IPR Denials, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 769 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2019/iss3/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20 9:04 PM 
 
769 
 
A Shenanigan in IPR Denials 
CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 770 
II. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 771 
A. The America Invents Act .......................................................................... 772 
B. The Administrative Procedure Act .......................................................... 773 
III. THE IPR INSTITUTION DECISION IS NONAPPEALABLE .................................. 774 
A. Appeal of the Patent Office’s IPR Institution Decision   
Is Barred by the Patent Act ................................................................... 774 
B. The Supreme Court Interprets the Patent Act’s § 314(d) ...................... 775 
C. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law .............................................. 776 
D. Additional Supreme Court Precedent on the Institution Decision .... 777 
E. The Federal Circuit Applies the Patent Act’s § 314(d) .......................... 779 
IV. SECTION 555(E) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE PATENT OFFICE’S NON-INSTITUTION DECISION ..... 781 
A. What Does the Administrative Procedure Act Generally Require? ... 781 
B. Does the Patent Act Foreclose a Remedy  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s § 555(e)? ....................... 782 
1. Is judicial review of the decision whether to institute inter 
partes  review precluded by statute, or is the decision 
“committed to agency discretion by law”? ................................. 783 
2. Does either status foreclose § 555(e) arguments? .......................... 785 
V. SEEKING JUDICIAL REDRESS  WHEN NO EXPLANATION IS PROVIDED ............. 787 
A. Is There a Concrete Injury? ....................................................................... 788 
B. What Cause of Action Should Be Used? ................................................. 789 
C. What Venue Would Be Proper? ............................................................... 793 
D. Can the Patent Office Assert Sovereign Immunity? ............................. 794 
E. What About the Line-Drawing Problem? ............................................... 795 
VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 797 
 
  
003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
770 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit decided a case about whether a petitioner for inter 
partes review (IPR) could seek judicial recourse after the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or Agency) 
declined to institute the review.1 In that case, In re Power 
Integrations, Inc., the court noted that judicial review of the 
Agency’s decision was barred by statute,2 and that review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement for a brief 
explanation was inapposite to the facts of the case.3 Because the 
Agency had provided the petitioner with a detailed explanation for 
its decision, the explanation requirement was satisfied.4 
But what if the Agency had not provided a detailed explanation 
for declining to institute inter partes review? What if the Agency 
had given the petitioner no explanation at all about why the 
petition was denied or about how to correct any deficiencies? 
Unfortunately, a dissatisfied petitioner might have a difficult time 
convincing a court to entertain the argument that the Agency must 
provide an explanation. Because the Patent Act bars appeals of the 
Patent Office’s decisions whether to institute inter partes review,5 
courts have been hesitant to touch any issue relating to the 
institution decision.  
Yet such a course of action by the Patent Office likely would fit 
within the category of “shenanigans” that the Supreme Court has 
said may be reviewable, despite the appeal bar.6 While a court may 
not review the merits of the institution decision,7 this Note argues 
that a court may compel a brief explanation from the Agency, as 
such recourse is expressly contemplated by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). Despite the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the 
petitioner’s APA argument in Power Integrations, the Patent Office 
is required to give a brief explanation when it denies petitions for 
inter partes review. The APA requires that agencies provide a brief 
 
 1. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 2. Id. at 1318 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012)). 
 3. Id. at 1319–20 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2018)). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (making the IPR institution decision “final and nonappealable”). 
 6. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
 7. Power Integrations, 899 F.3d at 1318. 
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statement of the grounds for denying a petition.8 That an agency’s 
decision to deny a petition is committed to its discretion does not 
relieve the agency from the APA’s procedural requirements. Thus, 
even though the Patent Office has discretion to deny institution  
of inter partes review,9 it must provide an explanation when it  
does so. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has statutory 
responsibility for granting patents.10 The authority and 
responsibility of the Patent Office to carry out its duties regarding 
patents is derived from Congress’s constitutional power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 The statutory powers and 
duties of the Patent Office relating to patents are found in the Patent 
Act, codified in Title 35 of the United States Code.12 Congress 
further defined the role of the Patent Office by passing the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act in 2011. 
As a federal agency exercising executive authority, the Patent 
Office is generally subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.13 
This means that, except where the Patent Act provides an 
exemption from the APA, the Patent Office must meet the APA’s 
requirements when it makes rules and carries out adjudications. 
Appeals of Patent Office decisions are taken to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over patent matters.14 In some circumstances, 
the Patent Act allows suits against the Patent Office in the United 
 
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). 
 9. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the Patent Office’s 
decision not to institute inter partes review is committed to agency discretion by law. Cuozzo, 
136 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) & 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)). This means that the tools 
of judicial review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act are generally unavailable 
to a dissatisfied petitioner for inter partes review. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (stating that 
Chapter 7 of Title 5 “applies . . . except to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law”). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390. 
 13. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141. 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.15 Appeals 
of these suits likewise go to the Federal Circuit.16 Having a single 
circuit for patent appeals allows patent law to develop uniformly 
throughout the country. As with all other circuit courts, decisions 
of the Federal Circuit can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.17 
A. The America Invents Act 
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA) into law.18 This Act is widely considered to be the most 
substantial change to patent law since 1952.19 A significant feature 
of the AIA was the creation of certain adjudicative proceedings that 
allow the Patent Office to reevaluate the patentability of an issued 
patent. These proceedings, commonly referred to as post-grant 
proceedings, are inter partes review,20 post-grant review,21 and 
covered business method patent review.22 They are conducted by 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board), which is a subdivision 
of the Patent Office.23 Post-grant proceedings have been described 
as an attempt by Congress to expedite disputes about a patent’s 
validity.24 The most commonly-used of these proceedings is inter 
partes review,25 which is the subject of this Note. 
Inter partes review is an administrative adjudication 
proceeding through which any person other than the owner can 
 
 15. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 145, 146, 154(b)(4). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C). 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1254. 
 18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
as amended primarily in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA]. 
 19. See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 18 (7th ed. 2017); Renoj Zachariah, Note, Fighting the Troll Toll: The Case for Judicial 
Review of the U.S.P.T.O. Director’s Denial of a Petition to Institute an Inter Partes Review, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2275 (2017). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 311. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 321. 
 22. AIA § 18. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 326(c). 
 24. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 20 (2008) (“[Post-grant proceedings] will give third parties 
a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation to resolve questions 
of patent validity”). 
 25. See Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review, 
and Post-Grant Review Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1 (2014/2015) 
(noting that as of Aug. 14, 2014, 1614 IPR petitions and 204 CBM petitions had been filed). 
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challenge the patentability of a U.S. patent.26 The scope of the 
proceeding is limited to grounds of novelty or nonobviousness,  
and the prior art that can be asserted against the challenged patent 
is limited to other patents and printed publications.27 To seek inter 
partes review, a challenger files a petition with the Patent Office 
that identifies which claims of the patent it is challenging, and on 
what grounds.28 The patentee may file a preliminary response, 
giving reasons not to institute the proceeding.29 The Board then 
makes a decision whether to institute inter partes review of the 
challenged patent.30 If the Board decides to institute the review, the 
Board and the parties follow certain procedures, some of which are 
defined by statute,31 and others of which are codified as Patent 
Office regulations.32 The Board must issue a final written decision 
within one year of the institution date.33 
B. The Administrative Procedure Act 
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.34 
The APA is a statutory scheme that supplies default procedures for 
governing administrative agencies’ actions and courts’ review of 
those actions.35 It places procedural and substantive restrictions on 
how agencies regulate entities within their spheres of influence.36 It 
also provides a means whereby dissatisfied parties may seek 
redress of grievances with the agencies through judicial review.37 
The chapter of the APA on judicial review, Chapter 7 of Title 5,38 
 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Novelty is a requirement for patentability, and is governed by 
35 U.S.C. § 102. Nonobviousness is also a requirement for patentability, and is governed by 
35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 312(a)(3). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 313. 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 314. 
 31. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. 
 32. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.1–42.123 (2018). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 
701–706 (2012)). 
 35. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 305–06 (7th ed. 2016). 
 36. Id. at 303. 
 37. See 5 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2018). 
 38. This Note refers to sections and chapters of the Administrative Procedure Act by 
their codified numbers in Title 5 of the United States Code, rather than their numbers in Pub. 
 
003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
774 
 
gives details of the availability, timing, form, and scope of such 
review.39 A frequently cited provision of that chapter is the 
standard that agency action must be set aside by a reviewing court 
when the action is arbitrary or capricious.40 Other standards found 
in the same section require that agency decisions comply with 
constitutional and statutory law, among other things.41 
One of the procedural requirements of the APA is that agencies 
must provide brief explanations when they deny requested actions, 
including adjudication proceedings.42 This requirement allows 
courts to compel an agency to provide such an explanation in the 
event the agency has failed to do so. 
III. THE IPR INSTITUTION DECISION IS NONAPPEALABLE 
The Patent Office’s decision whether to institute inter partes 
review falls outside of a court’s jurisdiction to review agency action. 
Appeal of the decision is barred by the Patent Act, and courts have 
made it clear that this bar prevents them from reviewing the merits 
of the decision. 
A. Appeal of the Patent Office’s IPR Institution Decision  
Is Barred by the Patent Act 
Statutory authority to institute inter partes review is given to 
the Director of the Patent Office.43 The Director has delegated this 
authority to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.44 The Board is not 
required to institute a review.45 Further, the Patent Act expressly 
bars an appeal of the decision to institute inter partes review in 
§ 314(d), which says “[t]he determination by the Director whether 
to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final 
and nonappealable.”46 
 
L. No. 79-404. For example, the section on the scope of judicial review of agency action is 
herein § 706 of the APA, rather than section 10(e) of the APA. This practice is common, 
though not exclusive, in administrative law. LAWSON, supra note 35, at 306 n.7. 
 39. LAWSON, supra note 35, at 305–06. 
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(D). 
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012). 
 44. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2018). 
 45. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). 
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B. The Supreme Court Interprets the Patent Act’s § 314(d) 
The Supreme Court has examined the IPR nonappealability 
provision of the Patent Act in the context of an inter partes review 
that was instituted on grounds other than those sought by the 
petitioner.47 In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Board had 
instituted inter partes review of certain claims on obviousness 
grounds that were not expressly raised by the petitioner.48 The 
patentee objected, pointing out that the IPR statute requires a 
petition for inter partes review to state “with particularity” the 
grounds for challenging the patent.49 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
said that it was precluded from reviewing the Board’s institution 
decision because § 314(d) made that decision nonappealable.50 The 
petitioner argued that the statute only precluded an interlocutory 
appeal, and that the court could review the institution decision as a 
review of a final order.51 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, 
pointing out that other sections of the Patent Act already limit 
appeals from an inter partes review to consideration of the Board’s 
final written decision, a fact that would make § 314(d) nugatory if 
interpreted solely to restrict interlocutory appeals.52 The Supreme 
Court affirmed, noting that the language of § 314(d) is plain: “the 
‘determination by the [Patent Office] whether to institute an inter 
partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.’”53 
In holding that the Patent Act’s § 314(d) generally bars judicial 
review of the Patent Office’s IPR institution decision, the Court left 
open the possibility for an appeal on grounds outside of the 
institution decision statute.54 Not surprisingly, the Court said that 
constitutional questions may establish permissible grounds for 
review of the institution decision.55 The Court also said that there 
may be questions of statutory rights beyond § 314(d) that would 
 
 47. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016). 
 48. Id. at 2138. 
 49. Id. at 2139 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 52. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 319 & 141(c)). 
 53. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139 (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)). Justice 
Alito and Justice Sotomayor agreed with the petitioner on this point; they would have held 
that § 314(d) precludes only interlocutory appeals. Id. at 2149 (Alito, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 54. Id. at 2141–42 (majority opinion). 
 55. Id. at 2141. 
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allow a court to review the decision. The Court noted that 
“constitutional questions,” questions depending on “other less 
closely related [to § 314(d)] statutes,” or “questions of 
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well 
beyond” § 314 could possibly be avenues for appeal.56 
One important statement from the Court in Cuozzo is its 
assertion that the decision of the Director to deny institution of inter 
partes review is “a matter committed to the Patent Office’s 
discretion.”57 In so asserting, the Court cited the APA’s subsection 
on preclusion of judicial review.58 Specifically, the Court pointed to 
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), which places agency decisions that are 
“committed to agency discretion by law” outside the reach of the 
APA’s judicial review provisions.59 The Court reasoned that the 
Agency is not required to institute inter partes review in any 
circumstance.60 While there is a threshold requirement to institute 
review—the Patent Office must first find that “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
1 of the claims challenged in the petition”61—there is “no mandate 
to institute review” and thus the institution decision is “committed 
to [agency] discretion.”62 
C. Committed to Agency Discretion by Law 
The jurisprudence on the “committed to agency discretion by 
law” preclusion doctrine has been described as being “as confusing 
as any body of doctrine in administrative law—which is saying 
quite a lot.”63 By the APA’s terms, Chapter 7 of Title 5 is not 
applicable “to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law.”64 This means that the APA’s statutory 
provisions that generally direct how agency action will be reviewed 
by a court are not available for agency action committed to agency 
discretion. These provisions include the APA’s waiver of sovereign 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 2140. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
 62. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140. 
 63. LAWSON, supra note 35, at 1003. 
 64. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018). 
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immunity,65 the general statutory cause of action,66 and the 
substantive grounds for compelling or setting aside agency action.67 
But as this Note discusses infra, federal courts have held that the 
APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is still applicable when  
suing an agency for specific relief, even if judicial review is 
otherwise unavailable. 
Because the Patent Office’s decision to deny a petition for inter 
partes review is committed to agency discretion by law, a 
dissatisfied petitioner cannot get a court to review the denial under 
the arbitrary or capricious standard, or under any other grounds in 
APA § 706.68 
D. Additional Supreme Court Precedent on the Institution Decision 
The Supreme Court has heard two cases of relevance to the 
Patent Office’s IPR institution decision since the Cuozzo case.69 In 
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, the 
Court reiterated its view from Cuozzo that “[t]he decision whether 
to institute inter partes review is committed to the Director’s 
discretion.”70 On the same day, the Court issued a companion IPR 
decision to Oil States. In SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the Court did 
not use the language “committed to agency discretion,” or any 
equivalent.71 At its core, the case was about whether the Patent 
Office could institute inter partes review of some, but not all, patent 
claims challenged in the petition.72 The Court said no; such “partial 
 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
 67. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 68. Scholars have debated whether agency action that is committed to its discretion is 
nevertheless reviewable under § 706(2)(A)’s “abuse of discretion” standard. Ronald M. 
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 694–95 
(1990). The Supreme Court has definitively stated that such action is unreviewable, even 
under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 700. 
 69. At the time of writing this Note, another case is before the Court about whether 
the appeal bar in 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) extends to decisions of the Patent Office to institute inter 
partes review after determining that the Patent Act’s time bar in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) does not 
apply to the case. Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, No. 18-916 (U.S. argued Dec. 9, 2019). 
 70. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 
(2018) (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016)); see also id.  
at 1378 n.5 (“[T]he decision to institute review is . . . committed to [the Director’s] 
unreviewable discretion.”). 
 71. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 72. Id. at 1354. The regulation establishing the Patent Office’s “partial institution” 
practice was found at 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2018), now abrogated by SAS Institute. 
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institution” runs counter to the plain text of the Patent Act in 
§ 318(a), which says the Board “shall issue a final written decision 
with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by 
the petitioner.”73 The Court interpreted this statute to mean that the 
Board must address the patentability of all claims challenged in the 
petition. It thus follows that the Board, when instituting review, 
must do so for all challenged claims. So, the Director cannot deny 
institution on some claims while granting institution on other 
claims challenged in the same petition.74 
But to say this, the Court had to overcome the argument that it 
had no power—because of § 314(d) of the Patent Act—to review the 
denial of institution on some of the challenged claims.75 The Court’s 
ready answer was that the APA “directs courts to set aside agency 
action ‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.’”76 Since partial institution 
was not in accordance with § 318(a) of the Patent Act, the APA gave 
the Court power to set aside the Patent Office’s regulation that 
established the partial institution practice. 
SAS Institute’s use of the Administrative Procedure Act in the 
IPR institution decision context and Cuozzo’s language that the IPR 
non-institution decision is “committed to the Patent Office’s 
discretion”77 can be reconciled. Cuozzo explained, 
 N evertheless, in light of § 314(d)’s own text and the 
presumption favoring review, we emphasize that our 
interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the 
decision to institute inter partes review consist of questions that 
are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes 
related to the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes 
review. . . . This means that we need not, and do not, decide the 
precise effect of § 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional 
questions, that depend on other less closely related statutes, or 
that present other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms 
of scope and impact, well beyond “this section.”78 
 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 74. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 75. Id. at 1359. 
 76. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2018)). 
 77. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). 
 78. Id. at 2141 (citation omitted). 
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In other words, SAS Institute’s use of the APA to require the 
Patent Office to institute inter partes review (if at all) on all 
challenged claims must be read as looking well beyond § 314. In 
light of SAS Institute and Cuozzo, the final decision statute in § 318 
of the Patent Act must have a scope and impact well beyond the 
institution statute in § 314. Alternatively, § 318’s requirement of 
addressing all challenged claims in the final written decision is less 
closely related to § 314 than the statute at issue in Cuozzo. That 
statute was § 312 of the Patent Act, requiring that the petition for 
inter partes review be “pleaded ‘with particularity.’”79 
Last, the Cuozzo Court had noted that “shenanigans” of the 
Patent Office acting “outside its statutory limits” would allow a 
court to review the action under the APA in an appeal.80 The Court 
reiterated this point in SAS Institute.81 
E. The Federal Circuit Applies the Patent Act’s § 314(d) 
The Federal Circuit has stated that the Patent Act’s bar to 
appealing the IPR institution decision in § 314(d) applies equally 
well to decisions to deny institution of inter partes review as it 
applies to decisions to grant institution.82 In In re Power Integrations, 
Inc., the court applied the Cuozzo holding in a case where the Patent 
Office had supplied detailed written explanations for its denials of 
institution of inter partes review.83 The Agency had issued four 
written decisions, each between fifteen and twenty pages, 
explaining why institution was not merited in that case.84 These 
non-institution decisions thus met the APA’s requirement—found 
at 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)—to provide a brief statement of the grounds for 
denying the petition for inter partes review.85 The Federal Circuit 
denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to have the Patent Trial 
 
 79. Id. at 2142. 
 80. Id. at 2141–42. 
 81. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 82. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Cuozzo, 
136 S. Ct. at 2140). The Federal Circuit’s reading of Cuozzo on this point appears flawed, 
because it conflates agency decisions that are “committed to agency discretion by law” and 
agency decisions for which “statutes preclude judicial review.” See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The end 
result is the same, however, because both conditions lead to the unavailability of Chapter 7 
of Title 5. 
 83. Id. at 1320. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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and Appeal Board reconsider its denials, evaluate certain evidence 
that the petitioner alleged the Board had not adequately weighed, 
and “provide an adequate explanation for its non-institution 
decisions” as required by § 555(e).86 The court pointed out that the 
statute prohibits judicial review of the substance of the Board’s 
decision, and asserted that asking for mandamus was just an 
attempt to bypass the statutory prohibition of review.87 
The court’s rejection of the petitioner’s § 555(e) argument in 
Power Integrations can fairly be viewed as saying that the 
explanations provided by the Board in that case satisfied the 
requirement of § 555(e), rather than that § 555(e) does not apply to 
the institution decision. Because the Patent Office had provided 
detailed explanations for its denial of a petition, there was nothing 
more for § 555(e) to do. 
In an earlier case, St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. v. 
Volcano Corp., the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of the Patent 
Office’s non-institution decision.88 The court pointed out that the 
Patent Act authorizes appeals of IPR cases to the Federal Circuit 
only after the Board has issued a “final written decision.”89 A non-
institution decision is not a “final written decision” within the 
meaning of the IPR statutes.90 In such cases, inter partes review has 
not been instituted and conducted, two conditions contemplated by 
the final decision statute in § 318(a) of the Patent Act.91 
Furthermore, the court noted that the statute expressly bars an 
appeal of the institution decision.92 The court speculated, but did 
not decide, that review by any route may be precluded by § 314(d).93 
The Federal Circuit has since treaded more carefully with such 
speculation; in Power Integrations, the court noted possible avenues 
for appellate review or mandamus, citing the possibilities that 
Cuozzo left open, including “constitutional issues, issues involving 
 
 86. Id. at 1319–21. 
 87. Id. 
 88. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 89. Id. at 1375 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012)). 
 90. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)). 
 91. Id. at 1375–76. 
 92. Id. at 1376 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)). 
 93. Id. 
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questions outside the scope of section 314(d), and actions by the 
agency beyond its statutory limits.”94 
IV. SECTION 555(E) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT IS 
APPLICABLE TO THE PATENT OFFICE’S NON-INSTITUTION DECISION 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has invoked the 
Administrative Procedure Act as a basis for correcting the Patent 
Office’s practice of “partial institution” of inter partes review.95 In 
the Court’s reasoning in SAS Institute, the partial institution 
practice was counter to the Patent Act’s requirement in § 318(a) of 
providing a final decision on any challenged claim.96 Therefore, the 
APA’s requirement in § 706(2) that agency action accord with  
law was apropos for overturning the Patent Office’s partial 
institution practice.97 
It is interesting that the Court did not hesitate to use § 706 of the 
APA to review a Patent Office action (the partial institution 
practice) in a context related to the decision of whether to institute 
inter partes review, despite the decision being unappealable and 
committed to agency discretion. This indicates that there can be 
scenarios in which a statute not “closely related” to the institution 
statute, § 314, can be invoked while seeking review of a Patent 
Office action in a context that is related to institution. 
The APA’s § 555(e) is such a statute. 
A. What Does the Administrative Procedure Act Generally Require? 
The Supreme Court in SAS Institute said that “agency action 
‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations’” can be set aside pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act.98 This language is found in the 
APA’s section on the scope of judicial review of agency action.99 
That section provides additional grounds for setting aside agency 
action, including action that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse 
 
 94. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 95. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018). 
 96. Id. at 1357. 
 97. Id. at 1359. 
 98. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2018)). 
 99. 5 U.S.C. ch. 7. 
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of discretion,”100 “contrary to constitutional right,”101 “short of 
statutory right,”102 and “without observance of procedure required 
by law.”103 These additional grounds were cited by the Supreme 
Court in Cuozzo as possible means to review a Patent Office action 
related to the IPR institution decision.104 
In addition to complying with these standards under which a 
court generally may set aside agency action, an agency must follow 
certain procedures required by statute. The APA provides a default 
set of procedures for agency actions.105 One such procedure is the 
requirement of § 555(e) that an agency provide a brief explanation 
for denying a petition.106 This requirement can be another possible 
ground for asserting that the Patent Office has not followed the law, 
under circumstances where the Agency denies a petition and fails 
to provide an explanation for its decision. 
Admittedly, the requirement of § 555(e) is “modest.”107 
Nevertheless, it is a statutory requirement, and the Patent Act does 
not indicate that Congress intended to exempt the Patent Office 
from it. 
B. Does the Patent Act Foreclose a Remedy  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act’s § 555(e)? 
The fact that the Patent Act bars an appeal of the Patent Office’s 
IPR institution decision might seem to indicate there is also no 
remedy under the APA when a petitioner is unsatisfied with a 
decision not to institute review and when the Patent Office has not 
explained its denial. Indeed, there are two reasons the APA might 
be unavailable as a litigation tool in this context. First, the Patent 
Act expressly states that the decision is “final and 
nonappealable.”108 This fits within the APA’s removal of its judicial 
 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 101. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 
 102. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
 103. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 
 104. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
 105. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2018). The Supreme Court has held that this section constitutes 
the extent of the APA’s procedural requirements for informal adjudications. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655–56 (1990). 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). 
 107. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Roelofs 
v. Sec’y of Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
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review tools when a statute “preclude[s] judicial review.”109 
Second, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Patent Office’s 
authority to deny institution of inter partes review as “a matter 
committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”110 This categorization 
would remove the APA’s judicial review tools from review of 
denials based on the APA’s clause covering “agency action [that] is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”111 
But these potential barriers to judicial review in the context of 
an IPR denial should not apply when a petitioner is only seeking 
an explanation for the denial. A petitioner for inter partes review 
who does not receive an explanation from the Patent Office for a 
denial should be able to successfully appeal on the basis of the 
Agency’s failure to briefly state the grounds for the denial. A failure 
to state the grounds for a denial is logically distinct from the 
decision itself to deny the petition. Under this theory, the  
APA’s standards for judicial review would apply in full force to the 
explanation requirement of § 555(e), even though the decision  
is unreviewable. 
An alternative route for a dissatisfied petitioner is to ask a court 
to compel the Agency to provide a brief explanation for the denial 
as a matter of legal right. That is, the petitioner would sue the Patent 
Office to get the explanation. But this path would be complicated 
by the APA’s preclusion clauses. 
1. Is judicial review of the decision whether to institute inter partes  
review precluded by statute, or is the decision “committed to agency 
discretion by law”? 
Section 701(a)(1) of the APA makes Chapter 7 of Title 5 (the 
judicial review chapter) inapplicable to an agency decision “to the 
extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”112 This is intuitive; 
how could standards intended for judicial review apply when 
judicial review is precluded in the first place? The Patent Act’s 
§ 314(d) seems to provide just such a preclusion by making the IPR 
institution decision “final and nonappealable.”113 This alone would 
 
 109. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
 110. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). 
 111. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 112. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
 113. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). 
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be enough to make the APA’s Chapter 7 standards inapplicable to 
the institution decision. But the Supreme Court has reinforced—
arguably unnecessarily—Chapter 7’s unavailability to the IPR 
denial decision by invoking in Cuozzo the committed to agency 
discretion language. 
In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Patent Office’s decision to deny a petition for inter 
partes review is “committed to the Patent Office’s discretion,” 
citing § 701(a)(2).114 Just like § 701(a)(1), the APA’s § 701(a)(2) 
forecloses the use of the judicial review tools for reviewing  
agency actions that are deemed “committed to agency discretion  
by law.”115 
It is worth pointing out that the Supreme Court has made an 
effort to give both clauses of § 701(a) effect, meaning that 
“committed to agency discretion by law” is necessarily a status that 
does not stem from a statute making the agency decision 
unreviewable.116 So if the Court’s language in Cuozzo about 
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA is consistent with prior Court precedent, 
then an IPR non-institution decision is not unreviewable because of 
the appeal bar in the Patent Act’s § 314(d), but rather because the 
Patent Act does not require the Patent Office to institute inter partes 
review in any given case.117 In other words, a non-institution 
decision is “committed to agency discretion by law” because the 
Patent Office may deny inter partes review for any reason.118 This 
is in contrast with a decision to grant institution, for which the 
Patent Office must first find that there is a “reasonable likelihood” 
that at least one claim challenged will be found unpatentable.119 So 
for decisions to grant a petition for inter partes review, institution 
is not “committed to agency discretion.” But these decisions 
squarely fall within the Patent Act’s § 314(d) appeal bar. Of course, 
the end result is the same; Chapter 7 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act does not apply to the institution decision, whether 
the justification falls under § 701(a)(1) or under § 701(a)(2). 
 
 114. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140. 
 115. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 116. See Levin, supra note 68, at 700 n.50. 
 117. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)) (noting there is “no mandate 
to institute review”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
003.BRIMLEY_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:04 PM 
769 A Shenanigan in IPR Denials 
 785 
 
2. Does either status foreclose § 555(e) arguments? 
An agency decision that is “committed to agency discretion by 
law,”120 or for which judicial review is precluded, should not be 
immune to the APA’s general requirement that the agency provide 
a brief explanation for denying a petition. Although Chapter 7 of 
Title 5 is foreclosed by its own terms to a court reviewing such an 
agency decision, the other APA provisions remain available. Thus, 
because § 555(e) is found in Chapter 5 of Title 5, rather than Chapter 
7, it is not foreclosed—at least according to the plain text of 
§ 701(a)—for those agency actions that are made unreviewable by 
statute or that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”121 
Even if the Patent Office has absolute discretion to deny 
institution of inter partes review (which it does), including denying 
a completely meritorious petition (which it can), the Patent Office 
must still give reasons for its denial. In other words, the Patent 
Office does not have discretion to not explain its decision  
denying institution. 
Admittedly, this proposition is disputed by some judges. For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
has held that the APA’s § 555(e) does not apply to an agency 
decision for which there is no right of review available to the 
plaintiff.122 The court reasoned that the purpose of § 555(e) is “to 
allow a reviewing court to assess the agency’s decision,” and that 
when there is no right of review available, a plaintiff suffers no 
prejudice “that would entitle them to relief.”123 In other words, the 
Tenth Circuit views the explanation required by § 555(e) as an aid 
only to a court reviewing an agency’s decision. 
But other courts have found more purposes behind § 555(e). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has  
noted that the APA’s requirement for a brief statement of the 
grounds for denying a petition not only aids a reviewing court, but 
also “ensures the agency’s careful consideration” of petitions, and 
allows a petitioner to inform the agency “of any errors it may  
have made.”124 
 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 121. Id. 
 122. High Country Citizens All. v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Tourus Records, Inc. v. DEA, 259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Some judges have expressly opined that § 555(e) does create a 
legal requirement for an agency to provide a brief statement of 
grounds for denying a petition, even when the underlying decision 
is not reviewable. In one case, the U.S. Board of Parole had 
appealed a district court order that required the Board to provide 
written reasons for denying parole applications.125 Concurring with 
the majority, Judge Leventhal said that “[the APA]’s procedural 
provisions for notice, opportunity to make a presentation, and a 
brief statement of reasons apply even where the action is fully 
‘committed to agency discretion’ and thus not judicially 
reviewable.”126 The court affirmed that the Parole Board must 
provide written reasons for denying applications for parole, but 
reached that result on constitutional grounds.127 Judge Leventhal 
concurred in the result, but noted that he would have decided the 
case on statutory grounds under the APA.128 He argued that 
§ 555(e) applies even without Chapter 7 because the Parole Board 
“does not have discretion to withhold a statement of reasons  
for denying parole,” even if the decision itself is committed to 
agency discretion.129 
In another case, then-Justice Rehnquist said that the statement 
of reasons requirement under the APA is independent of the 
availability of judicial review.130 In that case, the Supreme Court 
ruled that an agency-specific statute required an explanation, 
which the agency had not adequately given.131 Justice Rehnquist 
reached that result as well, but under the APA.132 In addition, the 
lower court in that case had noted that one of the reasons for 
§ 555(e), “assuring careful administrative consideration” of an 
agency decision, “would be relevant even if the [agency’s] decision 
were unreviewable.”133 
In addition to some judges—who were well versed in 
administrative law—asserting that § 555(e) applies even for agency 
 
 125. Childs v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 126. Id. at 1288 n.8 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 1279 (opinion of the court). 
 128. Id. at 1288 n.8 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 593–94 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
result in part and dissenting in part). 
 131. Id. at 573 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 593–94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). 
 133. Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 88 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974), rev’d, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). 
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decisions that are unreviewable, at least one scholar has argued the 
same.134 While discussing “reviewable” issues in the context of 
otherwise-unreviewable agency action, Ronald Levin says that 
“[a]t a minimum, courts presumably may enforce the APA’s 
requirement that an agency’s denial of a request to commence  
a proceeding be accompanied by a ‘brief statement of the grounds 
for denial.’”135 
Though there is debate over whether the APA’s § 555(e) applies 
to agency decisions that are unreviewable, courts should err on the 
side of requiring brief explanations from agencies because doing so 
will increase the thoughtfulness of agency decisions and 
consequently advance the development of rational legal rules. In 
patent law, requiring the Patent Office to provide explanations 
when it denies petitions for inter partes review will increase the 
patent bar’s collective knowledge of how the requirements for 
patentability are applied by the Patent Office. This in turn will 
increase the quality of representation before the Patent Office 
generally and allow for more efficient resolution of disputes during 
inter partes review specifically. 
V. SEEKING JUDICIAL REDRESS  
WHEN NO EXPLANATION IS PROVIDED 
In the previous Part, this Note argues that a dissatisfied 
petitioner for inter partes review has a legal right under § 555(e) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act to receive a brief explanation 
from the Patent Office for its non-institution decision. But there is 
also a question of whether the petitioner will be able to secure a 
remedy for that legal right. The petitioner will likely face some 
hurdles persuading a court to grant redress. 
As part of the justiciability requirement of standing, an IPR 
petitioner must establish that a concrete legal injury resulted from 
not receiving an explanation.136 The petitioner must also have a 
recognized cause of action to pursue.137 Another important 
consideration is the choice of venue in which to pursue the action.138 
 
 134. Levin, supra note 68, at 762. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). 
 137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) (allowing a court to dismiss a case for improper venue). 
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That choice may depend on the particular cause of action pursued. 
Next, the petitioner must demonstrate that the government has 
waived sovereign immunity to allow the suit. Finally, even if the 
petitioner surpasses all justiciability and procedural hurdles, a 
court might hesitate to exercise power over the Patent Office due to 
a line-drawing problem: At what point does compelling the Patent 
Office to supply an explanation for a denial become a front for 
reviewing the Office’s decision? This Note addresses each of these 
concerns in turn. 
A. Is There a Concrete Injury? 
Receiving a brief explanation for a denial of a petition for inter 
partes review is more than just procedural fairness. An explanation 
actually aids the petitioner in addressing problems with the 
petition and pursuing a different course of action going forward. 
For example, petitioners may request the Board reconsider a 
petition after the Board has decided not to institute the inter partes 
review.139 If the initial petition for inter partes review is denied 
without explanation, the petitioner lacks key information to correct 
legal deficiencies that the original petition may have had. 
In addition to the possibility of requesting a rehearing by the 
Board, the petitioner can simply file new petitions with a narrower 
challenge to the patent.140 This scenario was contemplated by the 
Supreme Court in SAS Institute.141 The Court did not address 
whether simply repetitioning would comply with the IPR statutes, 
but recognized that it might be a way for the Patent Office to 
achieve increased efficiency.142 The Patent Office could, for 
example, inform the petitioner that the petition was overbroad in 
certain claim challenges, and that it might entertain a narrower 
scope in a new petition. 
One of the points made by the dissent in SAS Institute was that 
such back-and-forth between the Patent Office and the petitioner 
would be unnecessarily wasteful. In theory, the Board could deny 
 
 139. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018). 
 140. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2012) (providing that a petitioner is estopped from 
pursuing additional proceedings with respect to a particular claim after the Board issues a 
final written decision in an inter partes review of that claim). 
 141. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 n.* (2018). 
 142. Id. 
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a petition and notify the petitioner that it did not think much of 
some of the challenges made in the petition, but that if the petitioner 
refiled with a narrower focus, the Board would reconsider the 
petitioner’s challenge to the patent.143 The dissenting Justices 
viewed this possibility as a waste of time when, in their opinion, it 
was lawful for the Patent Office to institute partial review (the 
practice at issue in SAS Institute). Justice Ginsburg had strong 
words for such a result: there is no reason “to believe Congress 
wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly.”144 
The Justices in the majority did not address whether it would 
be legally problematic for the Patent Office to hint to a petitioner 
which claims challenged and grounds asserted in the petition were 
most plausible.145 They pointed out that if such a tactic is compliant 
with the Patent Act, it gives the Patent Office a lawful means of 
achieving the effect of partial institution.146 
This point supports the policy of requiring the Patent Office to 
provide explanations for its non-institution decisions. The Patent 
Office is likely to view SAS Institute’s holding—requiring 
institution of inter partes review on all challenged claims—as an 
added burden. This might incentivize the Patent Office to increase 
its denial rate—thus increasing the number of injuries to 
petitioners—to offset the increased burden. While the Patent Office 
has the legal discretion to do just that, it ought to provide detailed 
explanations of the denials so that petitioners can assess whether 
they should petition again with fewer challenges. Doing so would 
serve to mitigate the injuries petitioners face when they would 
otherwise lack understanding of the Agency’s denials. 
B. What Cause of Action Should Be Used? 
Of course, the potential injury a petitioner would face by not 
receiving an explanation for a denial would be redressable only if a 
court could compel the Patent Office to provide the explanation. 
One critical procedural consideration in pursuing an explanation 
for a non-institution decision through the courts is what cause of 
action to use. Potential causes of action are a suit under the 
 
 143. Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1358 n.* (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. 
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Administrative Procedure Act, an appeal from the Agency’s 
decision, a petition for a writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 
and a suit in the nature of mandamus. Each of these potential routes 
requires that the petitioner successfully distinguish the sought-
after explanation from the Patent Office’s actual decision of non-
institution, as the decision itself is made nonappealable by § 314(d) 
of the Patent Act.147 
To the first possible cause of action, if a petitioner successfully 
distinguishes the Patent Office’s decision not to institute review 
from the Office’s failure to provide the required explanation for its 
decision, there is a viable argument that the APA’s judicial review 
provisions would then apply to the failure to provide the 
explanation. Under this theory, the petitioner could sue the Patent 
Office in district court for an explanation. In this case, the petitioner 
would not be appealing the Office’s decision not to institute, but 
instead would be asserting a right to a brief explanation for the 
denial through the general review provisions of the APA. 
Alternatively, and to the second possible cause of action, the 
petitioner might appeal to the Federal Circuit. Under the 
“shenanigans” rule from Cuozzo148—reinvoked by the Supreme 
Court in SAS Institute149—the appellate court could hear the appeal 
by treating the Agency’s failure to explain its denial as a 
“shenanigan” that violates the APA’s explanation requirement.  
The court might agree that § 555(e) of the APA is “less closely 
related” to § 314 of the Patent Act and that it provides grounds for 
appellate review. 
To the third possible cause of action, mandamus could 
potentially provide relief for a violation of § 555(e) of the APA. 
Under the All Writs Act, a court can issue a writ “necessary or 
appropriate in aid of [its] respective jurisdiction[].”150 This statute 
indicates that issuance of a writ of mandamus could be proper—by 
a district or appellate court—when the court otherwise has 
jurisdiction over the matter before it. But the All Writs Act does not 
itself confer jurisdiction.151 Accordingly, the petitioner for the writ 
 
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
 148. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
 149. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). 
 151. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 (2002). 
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must cite another statute that grants subject matter jurisdiction to 
the court, or else the court will be powerless to exercise the writ.152 
To the fourth possible cause of action, a more plausible choice 
for mandamus in an unexplained non-institution situation is an 
action filed in district court under the Mandamus Act.153 Unlike the 
All Writs Act, the Mandamus Act does confer subject matter 
jurisdiction on the district courts, stating “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus 
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency 
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”154 This cause of 
action would seem to be a suitable choice for an IPR non-institution 
decision that goes without a statement of explanation, so long as 
the requirements for mandamus can be satisfied. But these 
requirements are quite stringent. 
There are three requirements that a petitioner for a writ of 
mandamus must satisfy in order to merit an issuance of the writ.155 
First, there must be no adequate alternative through legal channels 
to obtain the remedy sought.156 Second, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that its right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.”157 
Third, the court issuing the writ must find that it “is appropriate 
under the circumstances.”158 
The first requirement that there be no adequate alternative 
appears fairly straightforward to satisfy if there is no explanation 
for a non-institution decision: but for the court’s compulsion on the 
Agency, the petitioner will not receive the required explanation. 
The second and third requirements, however, are more tenuous. 
The fact that reasonable minds can disagree whether the APA’s 
§ 555(e) applies to agency decisions committed to agency discretion 
indicates that the right to the writ might not be clear and 
indisputable. Mandamus is an action for ministerial duties, rather 
than for discretionary acts.159 If the action is discretionary, then 
mandamus will not be granted. 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). 
 158. Id. at 381 (citation omitted). 
 159. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). 
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Furthermore, mandamus requires that the remedy be clearly 
appropriate to the circumstances. A court might find that 
mandamus in an IPR non-institution case is not appropriate under 
the circumstances for policy reasons of maximizing efficiency at the 
Patent Office and deferring to the Office’s decisions about its 
capacity to take on more inter partes reviews. 
In re Power Integrations, Inc. provides an example in which the 
Federal Circuit dealt with a mandamus petition after the Patent 
Office denied petitions for inter partes review.160 The petitioner 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Patent Office to 
reconsider its non-institution decisions.161 The cause of action that 
the petitioner used was the All Writs Act.162 The petitioner 
specifically asked the court to instruct the Patent Office to provide 
a reasoned decision after considering all the evidence and applying 
correct legal standards.163 The petitioner invoked the APA, § 555(e), 
as the basis on which the court could so instruct.164 But in that case, 
the Patent Office had not only provided explanations for its 
decisions, those explanations were “detailed.”165 This fact left 
§ 555(e) with nothing more to do; the low bar of a “brief statement 
of the grounds for denial” had been met. The court saw the petition 
for a writ of mandamus as a request to review the Patent Office’s 
decisions on the merits.166 This request, the court observed, was 
“just the camel’s nose under the tent.”167 The Agency’s explanations 
were sufficient to inform the petitioner of the Agency’s reasoning, 
and anything more would necessarily be a review of the merits of 
the decisions.168 
 
 160. In re Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 161. Id. at 1316–17. 
 162. Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
at 1, Power Integrations, 899 F.3d 1316 (No. 18-00147). Strangely, the petitioner cited 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 as the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, without providing an independent 
jurisdictional ground for the mandamus petition. Id. 
 163. Power Integrations, 899 F.3d at 1319. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1320. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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C. What Venue Would Be Proper? 
Next, an important procedural consideration for a dissatisfied 
IPR petitioner seeking an explanation for a denial is where to bring 
the cause of action. If the proper cause of action to pursue is an 
appeal, then the proper venue would be the Federal Circuit, which 
is the court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from inter partes 
review proceedings.169 One obstacle that the petitioner would face 
in appealing the Patent Office’s choice not to provide an 
explanation for its decision is that there has not been an inter partes 
review. By definition, a non-institution decision means that inter 
partes review was never instituted. Therefore, there arguably is 
nothing to appeal, at least as far as the Federal Circuit’s appellate 
jurisdiction over inter partes reviews can reach. 
If the cause of action pursued by the petitioner is a suit against 
the Agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, then the 
proper venue would be a district court. Assuming that Chapter 7 of 
the APA applies, the proper venue under § 703 is “a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”170 This is most likely the Eastern District of 
Virginia because that is the venue where the Patent Office  
resides and where other patent statutes assign suits against the 
Patent Office.171 
If the proper cause of action is in the nature of mandamus, then 
a petitioner could try either the Federal Circuit or a district court. 
The district court is arguably the best choice because the 
Mandamus Act gives the district courts “original jurisdiction of any 
action in the nature of mandamus to compel . . . any agency [of the 
United States] to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”172 This 
statute is thus a grant of subject matter jurisdiction and a provision 
of a cause of action. 
Alternatively, the petitioner could try getting mandamus at a 
district court or the Federal Circuit under the All Writs Act.173 But 
this statute does not provide a grant of jurisdiction, so the petitioner 
would need to independently establish subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012). 
 170. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018). 
 171. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (civil action to obtain patent); 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A) (civil action 
to challenge determination of patent term adjustment). 
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. 
 173. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
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The most likely independent basis for jurisdiction would be 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), but that jurisdictional basis may be 
inadequate on its terms; it is for appeals from the Board’s decision 
with respect to inter partes review.174 If the petitioner argues that 
this provides a basis to come before the court about the non-
institution decision’s missing explanation, the court might view the 
language of § 1295(a)(4)(A) as contemplating that an appeal may 
not arise after a non-institution decision. After all, the Patent Act 
states that the Director makes the decision to institute, not  
the Board.175 Even though the Director has delegated by regulation 
that institution authority to the Board,176 the statutory scheme 
might not allow the Federal Circuit to take an appeal arising  
from a procedural posture in which inter partes review has not 
been instituted. 
For this reason, likely the best option for a dissatisfied petitioner 
is filing an action in the nature of mandamus in the Eastern District 
of Virginia to compel the Patent Office to provide the needed brief 
statement of the grounds for denying the IPR petition. 
D. Can the Patent Office Assert Sovereign Immunity? 
Yet another hurdle that a petitioner must overcome is sovereign 
immunity. As an agency of the United States Government, the 
Patent Office is immune from suit unless Congress has  
waived immunity for a particular cause of action. A plaintiff must 
provide a waiver statute to overcome an agency’s defense of 
sovereign immunity.177 
For suits under the APA’s general cause of action, a waiver of 
sovereign immunity is provided in § 702.178 However, there is a 
question whether the APA’s waiver can apply for suits over an 
agency decision committed to agency discretion by law. Section 702 
says that it does not “affect[] other limitations on judicial review.”179 
Additionally, this waiver of sovereign immunity is in Chapter 7 of 
 
 174. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 
 175. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). 
 176. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2018). 
 177. See LAWSON, supra note 35, at 982. 
 178. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018). 
 179. Id. 
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Title 5, which on its face does not apply to agency actions 
committed to agency discretion by law.180 
Perhaps surprisingly, federal courts have generally held that 
the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to review of 
agency action, even when the review does not arise under the APA 
itself. For example, the D.C. Circuit has “‘repeatedly’ and 
‘expressly’ held in the broadest terms that ‘the APA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or 
not.’”181 In another example, the Federal Circuit said “[w]e hold 
that section 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity for non-
monetary claims against federal agencies, subject to the limitations 
in subsections (1) and (2). It is not limited to ‘agency action’ or ‘final 
agency action,’ as those terms are defined in the APA.”182 
Applying the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity in an action 
to compel the Patent Office to provide a brief explanation for its IPR 
non-institution decision is consistent with the waiver’s limit that it 
only apply in cases where specific relief, rather than monetary 
relief, is sought.183 
E. What About the Line-Drawing Problem? 
Assuming that the right to the explanation is clear, and a proper 
venue and cause of action can be found, a court still might hesitate 
to grant the remedy that a dissatisfied IPR petitioner seeks. 
Requiring the Patent Office to explain its denial, even if only briefly, 
creates a line-drawing problem: When does review of the 
explanation turn into review of the decision? In other words, what 
should a brief statement look like? If the Agency provided no 
explanation whatsoever, then the case is simple: the court compels 
the Agency to give a brief explanation. But what happens if the 
Agency did give some written reason? 
Suppose the Board were to give a brief statement of its reasons 
for denying a petition, but that the statement was not a “detailed 
explanation” like in Power Integrations. For example, what if the 
 
 180. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 181. Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Trudeau 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 182. Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed.  
Cir. 2011). 
 183. See Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 262 (1999). 
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Agency wrote, “Your petition for inter partes review is denied 
because the time required to address the petition was needed by 
the Board to go out to lunch”? This hypothetical reason obviously 
would not be contemplated by the statutory scheme that bases inter 
partes review on novelty and nonobviousness considerations. It is 
easy to say that such an explanation would really be no explanation 
at all. But would a court be overstepping its bounds—into territory 
of reviewing the decision itself—by requiring the Patent Office to 
give something more? 
As another example, what if the Patent Office issued a non-
institution decision that read, “The petition for inter partes review 
is denied because it did not present a reasonable likelihood that the 
challenged claims are unpatentable on novelty or nonobviousness 
grounds.” This second example lacks legal analysis. It is simply a 
conclusion that references the legal standard for institution. Would 
such a conclusory statement be sufficient to meet the modest APA 
explanation requirement? Reasonable minds may differ. Some 
would say that the lack of analysis and reasoning makes the 
explanation pointless. Others might say that the explanation 
adequately meets the APA requirement by invoking the novelty 
and nonobviousness grounds on which the Patent Office is 
supposed to evaluate petitions for inter partes review. Whatever 
the correct answer is, it is by no means clear-cut. The murky line 
between testing whether the Patent Office stated the grounds for its 
decision (which is what § 555(e) of the APA is for) and reviewing 
the Patent Office’s rationale for making a non-institution decision 
(which is prohibited by the Patent Act’s § 314(d)) might cause  
a court to avoid the question entirely. The court might  
invoke § 314(d)’s bar on appealing the institution decision as 
justification for refusing to compel the Agency to provide the 
statement of explanation. 
An adequate statement should explain—even if briefly—the 
Patent Office’s actual rationale for denying a petition for inter 
partes review. The explanation should not be merely conclusory 
but should include analysis that touches on why the grounds for 
review sought by the petitioner are not merited. This would satisfy 
the purpose of § 555(e) of the APA. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When the United States Patent and Trademark Office denies a 
petition for inter partes review, the petitioner has a legal right to a 
brief explanation for the denial. This right stems from § 555(e) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires agencies to 
provide a brief statement of the grounds for denying a petition. 
While judicial review of the Patent Office’s decision to deny a 
petition is itself unavailable, the Patent Act does not remove the 
APA’s requirement that the Agency provide a brief explanation. 
Because a petitioner for inter partes review has a legal right to 
a brief explanation when the Patent Office denies the petition, the 
petitioner should also have a legal remedy. Whether the most likely 
remedy is a suit in district court or an appeal at the Federal Circuit, 
courts should not deny the remedy under the pretense that it is 
barred by the Patent Act. There is a distinction between the non-
institution decision, which cannot be reviewed, and a failure to 
provide an explanation for the non-institution decision, which 
would be contrary to the APA. 
By requiring the Patent Office to give brief explanations when 
denying petitions for inter partes review, the APA ensures that the 
Office gives thoughtful consideration to its decisions. Furthermore, 
such explanations help to advance patent law’s development into a 
more coherent and better understood body of law. Last, these 
explanations help petitioners improve their petitions to more 
effectively raise meritorious grounds for inter partes review, while 
omitting tenuous grounds, thus saving the patent owner the 
trouble of fighting petitions that have a low chance of success but 
nevertheless require attention in an adversarial process. 
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